


PHILOSOPHY,  
RELIGION AND  
EDUCATION

# CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

*A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion*



## Filling the Middle East Vacuum

Two months after the catastrophic events in the Middle East, President Eisenhower has taken action to fill the dangerous power vacuum in the Middle East and to prevent the Russians from exploiting the situation. The action is a request from Congress for authority to lend economic aid, at his discretion, to the economies of the Arab nations and a stand-by authority of the kind Congress gave him in regard to the Chinese islands, to counter any aggression in the Middle East without further reference to Congress.

These actions have been hailed with moderate acclaim throughout the world. There has been acclaim because the whole world knows that the power vacuum is dangerous. The approval has been less than fervent for three reasons.

(1) The Russians are already in the Middle East and this belated action is not likely to dislodge them. They are there because of the serious overt blunders of British and French diplomacy, but even more by our more serious, though covert, blunders. We must not forget that it was fear of the growing Russian influence which prompted the British to engage in a gamble in which they lost all the influence which they had painfully built up in that region. As Eric Sevareid has pointed out, the loss of power by our allies in the Middle East has been our loss, and our supposed gain of influence in Asia will not compensate for this loss. No criticism of the futile gambles of Britain and France would be just, if it were not recognized that our blindness to the growing Russian influence drove them to this desperation. But be that as it may, the Russians are now in the Middle East. The Eisenhower doctrine has been compared to both the Truman Doctrine, which merely took Greece and Turkey under our protec-

tion when British power waned, and to the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine warned European nations not to fish in American waters. But it is more hazardous, and probably more futile, to warn them not to fish in their own backyard pond.

(2) The stand-by authority to use force in the case of Russian aggression assumes that the Russians will attempt a military venture. They have not made such an attempt since Korea. Why should they make the attempt in the Middle East when they have already got a foothold in Egypt by arrangement, and in Syria by subversion. The warning may therefore be as futile as the military pacts by which we have sought to contain Russian power. Meanwhile the Russians have made steady progress by political, rather than military, means. We are faced, in short, not with the menace of Russian military power in the Middle East but with the presence of Russian influence and prestige. The catastrophic loss of Communist prestige in the whole of Europe (except of course in certain neutralist Protestant theological circles, which seem to lack the moral sensitivity of secular European fellow-travellers) has not resulted in a corresponding loss of Russian power and prestige in Asia. We will make many mistakes if we fail to note this paradox.

(3) Many of our wisest commentators have pointed to the fact that the increase of the President's stand-by authority to wage war without specific approval of Congress tends to place too much power in a center of power already frighteningly excessive. It is ironic that this new power is needed to right a situation which developed during campaign months when rigorous action was not taken because it might have thrown doubt on the "peace

and prosperity" slogan in the minds of the voters. Foreign policy in a democracy is subject to peculiar hazards, which may be increased rather than diminished by very popular presidents. R. N.

### A MATTER FOR REGRET

OUR READERS will be interested in the statement by Professor Hromadka which we publish in this issue. But in publishing it we must record our regret and disappointment at Hromadka's incapacity to see that the Hungarian revolt was a rising of the vast majority of Hungarians—especially of workers and youth—against years of Communist untruth and injustices. Many of us, including the writer of this editorial, have believed in the past that Hromadka's original decision to support the Communist regime politically while opposing openly the Communist faith and philosophy was an experiment that should be given the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps he was able to use his position to keep the churches of Czechoslovakia from being less isolated than would otherwise have been the case; perhaps he was able to defend their opportunity to carry on their work. Hromadka certainly believed in

communism as a political and economic alternative for his country and for some years his voice had some power to persuade fellow Christians in the West that there was another side to the issues which divided the two worlds. But in recent years Hromadka's efforts to put the best face on things in the Communist world have steadily lost persuasiveness. Today his attitude toward Hungary reveals either extraordinary blindness to realities or it is the final exposure of a deliberate intention to rationalize every Russian move. It is shocking that Hromadka cannot even rise above the communism that prevails in Russia and Czechoslovakia to see positive significance in the stirrings in Poland and Hungary and Yugoslavia. If he has any independence of this crude Communist pressure, why did he not at least remain silent?

These things are truly said in sorrow and not in anger. Hromadka is an able theologian and a radiant and friendly Christian spirit. When he was in this country he was a much loved teacher. It is hard to see how his many friends in the West, who have admired him, can again take seriously what he says.

J. C. B.

## On the Hungarian Crisis

JOSEF L. HROMADKA

*We do not endorse Professor Hromadka's views which were issued by the news services of the Protestant churches in Czechoslovakia. They appear here for the information of our readers. See the editorial above.*

THE EDITORS

*The Hungarian events have shaken us all. We were not prepared for such a profound shock. We have sought every detail which might explain the course and meaning of the Hungarian crisis. But it was precisely the intense thinking about this which showed us how complicated is the European situation in general and the Hungarian in particular, and how difficult it is to form an exact and clear picture of what we witnessed at the end of October and in November. I hesitatingly offer my view of the situation. I do this on behalf of myself only. I was entrusted by no one to speak for him. Nevertheless I speak, doing so at the request of my friends and brothers abroad who directly asked for my opinion. I ask the readers to read these lines of mine with the awareness that I do not want to teach anyone, but to give testimony to what I think and feel in the difficult time of the Hungarian people who had become such close friends of ours in recent years.*

OUR FRIENDS and co-workers in the ecumenical movement will recall that I have several times drawn attention, orally and in writing, to the particular nature of the world political and church situation in which we have been living

since the famous meeting of statesmen in Geneva in July, 1955. On the one hand we have been experiencing a considerable relaxation of international tension and thus have achieved a certain assurance that the danger of a new world catastrophe had been averted. On the other hand, however, we realized that coexistence among nations is not to be taken for granted, and that the difficult political, economic and social conflicts between the different groups of states will, for a long time ahead, disturb relations between nations . . . However, in the moment that mankind was almost assured there would be no war, there came to the surface all the problems of the present time. The deep conflicts between different social and political systems appeared in all their urgency . . . It is not necessary to elaborate the point that in the present times it will be necessary to strive, with every sense of responsibility, through discussions, through a political, economic and spiritual exchange of views, for the prerequisites, not only of peace but also of creative international cooperation.

## Evils of the "Cold War"

For such work there must, of course, be a tranquil atmosphere. If relations between nations are filled with distrust, agitation, suspicion, or even hostile and subversive intentions, any creative efforts for understanding and peaceful coexistence are almost impossible. And here it is necessary to stress the fact that, while the Geneva meeting of statesmen in 1955 was a sort of agreement against a new war, it did not cleanse the atmosphere of mistrust or hostility. It did not stop the attempts to deepen conflicts between nations, which are called the "cold war." I do not wish to pronounce judgment on anyone. All of us are responsible for the atmosphere which was created among nations after the war. I wish only to draw attention to the ruinous and moral perversity of the "cold war," which can cause more moral harm than the "hot war" and can poison relations between nations for many decades. For in essence the "cold war" far exceeds the measure of justified criticism and controversy. It would be naive—yes, wrong—to shout down mutual criticism. Representatives and citizens of the "Western democracies" have a right to draw attention to their own advantages and to the mistakes and shortcomings of the other party. And in turn the citizens of socialist states can rightly praise the principles, order and institutions of the Soviet society or that of the People's democracies. There can be no world progress without competition and discussion, or without a struggle to apply those social and political principles we consider correct. But such a competition or struggle is thinkable only if the international atmosphere is not poisoned by crude propaganda and hostile attempts to cause the fall of those with whom we do not agree or with whom we are competing . . . If we have achieved at least the probability that a new catastrophe of war will not occur, it is our task to concentrate all our forces on the suppression of the "cold war." So long as we wage the "cold war," we disturb not only political, but also moral relations between nations, and live constantly in the danger of actual war. Therefore we have pointed out several times in our ecumenical relations the disaster of the "cold war" and our responsibility to work against it, just as we have hitherto worked against real war—in my opinion there is no more urgent task in ecumenical work.

These remarks are necessary in order to explain understandably my standpoint on the latest international events, especially on the tragedy of Hungary. I do not want to go over the question to what degree the Hungarian events are internationally related to the crisis around the Suez Canal . . .

There is no doubt, nevertheless, that the outbreak in Hungary and the Suez crisis gave the excuse for a frontal propaganda—but more than propaganda—attack on the power position of the Eastern Bloc. We stand continually in the midst of a grave international crisis. The boundary between the Western and Eastern world, passing through Central Europe and called the "Iron Curtain," is constantly the most sensitive spot in Europe and one of the most sensitive spots in the whole world. Here is being waged an undeclared, but no less serious, struggle for peace. Here is constantly being sought the point of "least resistance," which could serve to break the chain and to upset the People's Democratic systems and the power forces of the socialist camp. We do not want to oversimplify or to gloss over the situation as it has developed over the last ten years. We may say, however, that in certain circles in the Western world, hope was not relinquished of conquering the opponent and of finding the place and opportunity of supporting by every means those forces and groups behind the Iron Curtain which are being kept by the "cold war" in a constant state of readiness.

## Propaganda Intensified

The year 1956 has, and will have, an important place in the history of postwar Europe. A change occurred in the building of socialist countries, as a result of the new political line in the Soviet Union. Much has been said of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But it is not just a question of this Congress. It is a matter of a new era in socialist building, which had already begun before the Twentieth Congress. Representatives of the Soviet, Chinese and People's Democratic societies were consciously relying on the genuine change in international relations and coexistence. They expected that a permanent easing of relations between nations would occur and thought that we were standing on the threshold of a genuine peaceful coexistence. At the same time they had the conviction that the base of the socialist system was sufficiently firm that those political means and methods which had been created in the period of revolutionary tension during war and of danger after the war, could be liquidated.

The aim of socialism and communism is the social and economic liberation of man and the

Due to the timeliness of Professor Hromadka's article, we are postponing Amos Wilder's discussion of "The Church's Concern With The Arts" to a forthcoming issue.



strengthening of human dignity by a new social order. What we call the dictatorship of the proletariat is nothing permanent. It is a temporary means for creating a new social system. The special situation in the Soviet Union in the period between the two world wars, when society changed radically, and when hostile pressure from the West was without cease stepped up, led to political methods which lose their function in periods of normal development. The catastrophe of war which threatened the very foundations of the Soviet Union and which brought immeasurable suffering to millions of Soviet citizens was not favorable to a spontaneous development of the political and cultural life of its citizens.

Since 1953 hopes rose day by day in mankind that the danger of a new war had been averted. This also had a penetrating effect on Soviet society, especially when with the passing of Stalin the authority which supported the old system of Soviet policy also passed. Also a new social plane (i.e., socialist base) was assured both by progress made in Soviet society, and by the victory of the socialist revolution in China. The Korean War in 1950-1953 demonstrated that the power position of the Soviet Union and of People's China are, according to human judgment, unshakable in the East, and that only war with atomic and nuclear weapons could give any sort of hope for the victory of the Western world.

But we know that even this hope was also shown to be an illusion. What is to be done in this situation? We do not like to speak of this, but we cannot pass over in silence the fact that since last year intensified propaganda attempts were made to disintegrate the internal political life of Central European countries bordering on the Soviet Union separating it from the Western world. We were very disquieted by this fact. We know that the huge majority of west European and American citizens sincerely long, with us, for peace and peaceful cooperation among nations. We know this from our own experience. People throughout the world are tired of propaganda, tension and the threats of a new danger.

And yet we kept discovering in discussions with people from various countries that the prejudices, suspicions and schematic ideas about life behind the "Iron Curtain" do not disappear, but become more intensive in character. Whence comes this fact? What forces act to set up even more insurmountable barriers between nations? How is it that citizens who read the so-called free press in their countries and have access to all kinds of information still live in rigid concepts about another

country? Why does radio propaganda intensify its attacks, rather than moderate them, assailing public opinion in the People's Democracies ten times a day or more, trying to deepen the resistance to the new social and political system, to spread an atmosphere of distrust and to arouse the hope of possible "help from the West"? Who has an interest in this? Only the emigrés who left or ran away from their countries and are counting on a return to the old conditions? This surely does not suffice as explanation. What immense moral, psychological, political and economic harm has been done in this way! Who is responsible for the situation?

#### **Weaknesses Within Communist States**

We must not, of course, keep silent about the other side of this unfortunate situation. Changing the old society into a socialist society is very difficult in many ways. It is not merely a question of the external social, economic or political changes. A socialist society requires a new attitude toward property, toward personal interests, a new understanding of freedom and law. The relation of the individual to society and of society to the individual acquires a new character. Re-education is very difficult, not only because—as we have just said—foreign propaganda is systematically making it more difficult. But also because there are not enough wise, experienced men and women able to help others with determination, and also with facts, to understand the grandeur of the new tasks. It has often been necessary in economic, production or organizational changes to put insufficiently experienced people in responsible positions. It could not be done otherwise. Here lies the rather tragic side of contemporary events. In addition, we should mention the danger that many officials in these revolutionary times have become accustomed to administrative, dictatorial methods and, instead of patient persuasion, used the easiest means of pressure to bring things about. The accumulated mistakes were not corrected quickly enough and citizens, who formerly were nourished by hopes for the advantages of the new society, tolerated only with impatience the slow pace forward, the errors and harshness of responsible groups.

We should also speak of the residuum of ancient nationalism, even chauvinism and hopes of restoration, which were fed in a refined manner from abroad. Circles which depended on national passions and which held hopes of restoration had no intentions of rebuilding Hungary on the basis of "a progressive Western democracy." They were concerned rather with a revival of the old pre-war order, with the return to a policy which before and

during the Second World War, had attempted the revival of privileges and advantages for certain sections of the people and which linked these plans with national passion and an anti-Soviet program. This was a policy which had caused the Hungarian people immense harm in the past, which stood at the service of German Nazism and which was liquidated by the dreadful fall of Nazism in 1945.

### Events in Hungary

The beginnings of the events in Hungary were connected with the sincere desire of numberless citizens, members of the Workers' Party, intellectuals, and especially students, to surmount the internal shortcomings of the Hungarian society at a faster rate. Changes in Soviet domestic policy and also the events in Poland had their effect on the internal situation in Hungary and aroused impatience with those politicians and public officials who were made responsible for the shortcomings and mistakes, and who had not opened up rapidly enough the way to redress and progress. October 23 evidently expressed the endeavors of Hungarian citizens for a tranquil, but rapid, redress of the situation and for the inauguration of a better policy. How did the catastrophe come about? It will be a long time still before we get to know all the details of that day and the following days and before we penetrate to the reasons for the violent and tragic upheaval. Evidently the most responsible representatives of Hungarian political life lost their heads and were not able to estimate what actually was happening. They were too deeply isolated from the masses and from intellectuals. They hastily asked for the aid of Soviet military units, hastily called them off and lost their perspective on events.

From the very beginning, however, there were voices—besides those calling for a peaceful and organic redress—which raised slogans tinged with fascist nationalism, slogans expressing what had been suppressed for ten years, but which had been fermenting as a holdover from the Hungary which had fallen in 1945. And from the very beginning of the events there appeared on the soil of Hungary emissaries of emigré and other circles which had been prepared abroad for intervention and who had no interest in democracy, but rather in the fall of the socialist system in Hungary and in the inclusion of Hungary in the anti-Soviet bloc. The western frontiers of Hungary were opened over night, became the point of attack for foreign elements and the channel for all attempts and for all means (including weapons) to bring about a genuine counter-revolution. It was no longer a question of the struggle of the Hungarian people

for freedom. The Hungarian land was the scene of horrible counter-revolutionary passion, massacre and pogroms, in which thousands, perhaps tens of thousands perished—not only communists, but also Jews and older citizens.

We cannot forget these horrors. Even the voices of the Western German and French press were raised concerning the violent acts of the counter-revolution, and witnesses who return from Hungary tell of the disruption of the country, of the formation of local governments and of the settling of personal accounts in the most violent way. Even those Hungarians who were genuinely interested in a redress of the mistakes, sins and errors, recognize that the intervention of the Soviet Army on November 4, 1956, saved the Hungarians from terrible bloodshed and disintegration, and furthermore from national, chauvinist and social reaction, which could have taken the first step in Hungary toward a broader military conflict in Central Europe and perhaps in Europe in general.

### The Church's Task

Let us summarize in a few points what we, members of churches, should do to help the Hungarian people and to correct the mistakes which we have all made. Statesmen and politicians may revise their own methods and look for a better way ahead.

(1) We cannot isolate the Hungarian events and judge them without a knowledge of the large and small interrelations in the world in general and in Europe in particular. The case of Hungary showed us with mortal clarity that the difficult problems of individual nations can be resolved only in an atmosphere of general international trust and of peaceful coexistence. Everywhere we must make up for many mistakes. None of us can remain where we stand today. But the redress of shortcomings and the way to a higher level of justice, humanity and freedom is possible only if people cease to fear a new world conflict, when the threats and the base means of the "cold war" are replaced by mutual discussions and genuine competition. In the creation of such an atmosphere we, members of the Christian churches and theological workers, have our mission to perform.

(2) Let us not forget that in our endeavors for peaceful coexistence we must not ignore the result of the Second World War (and of the world revolution, beginning in 1914), and we must bring the interests of individual European and especially Central European nations into harmony with the economic, social and moral prerequisites for a new European society, as had begun to develop since the end of the last war. A desire to revive the pre-

war situation means to heap up explosives for a new conflict. Only the way forward may make the situation better. Any way back (a reaction) will cause chaos and bloodshed.

Just as freedom for the German nation must not mean a possibility of returning to the Nazi national program, in the same manner the liberties of no Central European nation can put into positions of leadership elements which helped on the way to the European catastrophe eighteen years ago. This does not mean the suppression of true national liberty. Rather it means a strengthening of national freedom for service to all nations. The Hungarian crisis signaled the danger that there would come to the surface that which would in a short while deprive their own people of genuine social progress and which would have created unbearable tension on the boundaries of Hungary. It is difficult to imagine how the situation would have looked in Central Europe, on the Czechoslovak frontiers, on the Rumanian and Yugoslav, if the "liberation" of the Hungarian nation had been carried out according to the plans of those who had seized leadership in the week of October 28 to November 4. Abstract judgments on the freedom and democracy of the nation which were raised in intellectual (and also ecclesiastical and theological) circles, and which ignored the complexities of the Hungarian situation, could not fail to deepen the difficult moral crisis in which European, but also non-European, public opinion found itself. It is not only a question of freedom (*in abstracto*), but of who would receive the freedom and for what purposes it would be used.

Are our friends in the Western countries aware of the fact that the first days of the so-called freedom witnessed thousands of murders, an anti-Jewish pogrom and restoration attempts of the most dangerous character? Are they aware of the fact that the whole of Central Europe could have gone through a senseless chaos in the course of which the most brutal passions of those who in 1945 were defeated and driven either into underground or exile would have been awakened?

(3) We return to what we have said about the "cold war." The Hungarian tragedy showed the consequences of the anti-Soviet hysteria cultivated systematically in many parts of the Western world. Will it be a lesson for the future? This we should understand at long last, that moral coexistence among nations and the social and political progress of Europe, Asia and other continents is unthinkable if the relations between one another are poisoned by anti-Soviet and anti-Communist negativity. Are we aware of the fact that such a

negativity undermines the creative forces of Western civilization, that it keeps alive reactionary instincts and makes it impossible for nations in the socialist sphere to overcome their shortcomings, to improve their political, economic and legal systems? We have a thorough understanding for the critical objections of a Westerner to the ideological system of Soviet society and that of the People's Democratic states. But those objections are no longer fruitful, are even harmful, if they are based in principle on anti-Soviet and anti-Communist negativity.

Whether the Western world and its churches realize it or not, their joy over the Hungarian uprising and their anger over the change on November 4, 1956, grow far more from anti-Soviet sentiments than from an interest in the liberty of the Hungarian nation. We have all had to reflect over the Hungarian events. But when we learned, by reading the Western press, listening to its radio and speeches, what passionate crusading indignation there was over the Soviet intervention, we fully realized that this passion had no true moral consecration and that it is dictated much less by the knowledge of facts than by that anti-Communist attitude which had for years been systematically cultivated by all possible means. I repeat: we have understanding for criticism and serious objections, but we are faced by the great task of learning to speak responsibly with one another about the difficulties which press hard on us all. This above-described attitude has caused measureless moral and material damage, not only to the Hungarian people, but to us all.

(4) As members of the church we are also responsible for our brethren in the Hungarian churches. Especially for us, the neighbors of the Hungarians, the events of the last weeks were a grievous blow. Unceasingly we had to think of the churches in Hungary and especially of those brethren with whom we cooperated so closely. We had been constantly thanking the Lord God that the relations between the churches of Hungary and Czechoslovakia had become so friendly in the last ten years. We had written a truly new chapter in the history of mutual cooperation. The Hungarian events also shook the leadership of the Hungarian Protestant churches. Evidently not all was in order in them. And redress was necessary. We also know that something had been already in the past year set right. We have understanding for the rehabilitation of those who had been wronged in past years. We read about one such case of rehabilitation in the official information from Hungarian

(Continued on page 196)



# INDEX TO VOLUME XVI\*

## February 6, 1956 to January 21, 1957

### Articles

Anderson, Paul B., Russian-American Visitations—a Prelude to Understanding .....	(I)	92
Anonymous, East Germany 1956: The Spirit and the Iron Curtain .....	(I)	84
Anonymous, In Faith . . . Praise, Thanksgiving and Joy .....	(T)	168
Barr, John S., Appeal to the West, An .....	(I)	152
Beach, Waldo, Storm Warnings From the South ..	(R)	27
Bennett, John C., Notes on Christian Responsibility and National Interest .....	(E)	100
Bowles, Chester, Why I Will Vote: Democratic ..	(P)	129
Boyd, Malcolm, The Crisis of the Mass Media ..	(A)	68
Farmer, William R., Cynicism and the Revival ..	(C)	35
Ford, Harold P., Centennial Thoughts About Wilsonian Diplomacy .....	(P)	176
Harrelson, Walter, Fact and Implication in the Dead Sea Scrolls .....	(T)	52
Herron, Shaun, Lonely Witness of Trevor Huddleston, The .....	(R)	61
Hoffman, Paul G., Why I Will Vote: Republican ..	(P)	129
Horton, Walter Marshall, Some Observations on the Frankfurt Kirchentag .....	(C)	146
Hromadka, Josef L., On the Hungarian Crisis .....	(I)	190
Huddleston, Trevor, C.R., Racial Conflict in South Africa, The .....	(R)	76
Johnson, R. Park, Arab Refugees and the Palestine Problem .....	(I)	11
Nelson, J. Robert, Irenicism in Lyon .....	(C)	22
Nixon, Justin Wroe, Freedom—a Permanent Issue ..	(P)	101
Pauly, Herta, Divorce and the Sanctity of Marriage ..	(T)	19
Pearson, Roy, Why Ministers Break Down .....	(C)	144
Reissig, Herman F., Another Look at the Arab-Israel Problem .....	(I)	44
Schattschneider, E. E., Has Partisanship Declined? ..	(P)	130
Scheide, William H., Thoughts on Protestant Church Music .....	(A)	107
Scott, Nathan A., Jr., Beneath the Hammer of Truth ..	(A)	124
Shepherd, George W., Jr., The Challenge of Colonialism and Racism .....	(I)	3
Shinn, Roger L., 'Fanaticism' of Christianity, The ..	(T)	116
Three Snapshots of the South .....	(R)	60
Thompson, Kenneth W., Europe's Crisis and America's Dilemma .....	(I)	181
Weisskopf, Walter A., Christian Criticism of the Economic Order .....	(Ec.)	159

### Editorials

Baillie, John, Magic of Christmas, The .....	(T)	165
Bates, M. Searle		
Barometer of the Far East .....	(I)	66
Comment in European Policy Discussion .....	(I)	186
International Scene: Good Society or Class Struggle, The .....	(I)	105
Suez and Colonialism .....	(I)	141
Beach, Waldo, Euphoria in Suburbia .....	(C)	33
Methodist General Conference: a Second Glance, The .....	(C)	73
Bennett, John C.		
Abundance and the Church .....	(Ec.)	58
A Matter for Regret .....	(I)	190
Approaches to Communism .....	(I)	74
Capital Punishment .....	(E)	50
Comment in European Policy Discussion .....	(I)	187
Conscience and the H-Bomb .....	(E)	157
Four Wrongs and the Future .....	(I)	173
Graham and Segregation .....	(R)	142
Karl Barth in Translation .....	(T)	122
Nehru's Contribution .....	(I)	175
New Mandate in a Changed World, A .....	(P)	149
Resourceful Mr. Pew, The .....	(C)	75
Toward a New Emphasis in Asian Policy ....	(I)	1

### Brown, Robert McAfee

Approach to Catholicism .....	(C)	51
Campaign Preview .....	(P)	59
Extension of the "Crisis," The .....	(I)	43
"Residential Segregation" .....	(R)	90
Fitch, Robert E.		
Republican Convention, The .....	(P)	114
Guardian, The		
American Aid to India .....	(I)	98
U.S. Policy Viewed Abroad .....	(I)	67
Hearn, Arnold W.,		
Consent of the Governed .....	(P)	143
Fund Under Fire, The .....	(E)	142
Ileitis Becomes Partisan .....	(P)	91
Intolerable Inhibition, An .....	(P)	106
Leader of the Opposition .....	(P)	151
Monaco and We-the-People .....	(E)	59
Scrolls and Christian Faith, The .....	(T)	66
Johnson, F. Ernest		
Long Road to Desegregation, The .....	(R)	174
Segregation and Federal Aid .....	(R)	82
Niebuhr, Reinhold		
British Experience and American Power .....	(I)	57
Comment in European Policy Discussion ....	(I)	186
Crisis in the Suez Canal, The .....	(I)	113
Filling the Middle East Vacuum .....	(I)	189
German Reunification .....	(I)	83
National Council Delegation to the Russian Church, The .....	(C)	49
New Hopes for Peace in the Middle East ....	(I)	65
New International Situation, The .....	(I)	150
Nikita Krushchev's Meditation on Josef Stalin ..	(I)	89
Race and Christian Conscience .....	(R)	99
School, Church, and the Ordeals of Integration ..	(R)	121
Significance of Suez, The .....	(I)	123
Stalin—Deity to Demon .....	(I)	42
Struggle in Hungary, The .....	(I)	174
There is no Peace .....	(I)	158
Yesterday's Anticipations and Today's Realities ..	(I)	81
Sherman, Franklin, Democratic Convention, The ..	(P)	115
Sittler, Joseph, Easter .....	(T)	25
Thompson, Kenneth W.		
Colonialism: An American Dilemma .....	(I)	41
Comment in European Policy Discussion .....	(I)	188
From Popular to Personal Diplomacy .....	(P)	97
Van Dusen, Henry P.		
Use and Abuse of "Paradox," The .....	(T)	17
Wilder, Amos N., Theology and the Bomb .....	(T)	9

### Reviews

Driver, Tom F., Shakespeare in Diminished Perspective .....	(Movies)	71
Hearn, Arnold W., Some Commandments Violated .....	(Movies)	163
May, William F., Hidden Talent, The .....	(Movies)	47
Romance of the Doer .....	(Television)	179
O'Gorman, Ned, Waiting for Godot .....	(Drama)	95
Scott, Nathan A., Jr., "Tea and Sympathy" ..	(Movies)	155

### Saint Hereticus

After Prayerful Consideration .....	(C)	79
Churchianity .....	(C)	55
Crying Need for Some Fresh Cliches .....	(T)	147
Layman's Guide to Ecclesiastical Infirmities, A ...	(C)	103
Three Easy Ways to Spoil Christmas, or Hark the Herald Square Angels Sing .....	(T)	171

\*The symbols appearing in the parentheses following the titles are used to indicate the subject dealt with. The key to the symbols is: (A) The Arts, (C) The Church, (E) Ethics, (Ec.) Economics, (I) International Relations, (P) Politics, (R) Race Relations, and (T) Theology.

## THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS

(Continued from page 194)

churches just before the catastrophe. But we have serious doubts that the Hungarian churches can be helped by the path of restoration, or that the way in which some of the changes occurred may not bring the danger that what should have died away with the old Hungarian society may be revived exactly in the church.

We were very disturbed also, when a voice of responsible ecumenical circles in Geneva spoke of the changes in the Hungarian churches in connection with the events occurring in those difficult days between October 28 and November 4, in a way which might give the reader the impression that the summer meeting of the World Council of Churches in Hungary could have helped to prepare such a "great day" of Hungarian counter-revolution. We do not want to be unjust, and we explain this voice *ad moliorem partem*. But we cannot keep silent about our uneasy feeling. In particular we do not believe that the freedom of the church is assured by a shift in the posts of bishops. We are not ready to serve as advocate for anyone. All of us must ponder on ourselves in a very critical way. But we shall not join the expressions of joy over the "great day" in which the office of Bishop was returned to former dignitaries, while thousands of people were murdered and the banner of social and political nationalism was raised on high.

(5) These lines were written with great anxiety and grief. The Hungarian events illuminated the international situation in a flash of lightning, but also showed what is at the depths of human souls. They showed the internal Babylonian captivity of

### In Our Next Issue

which will be devoted to problems of integration, J. OSCAR LEE writes of "the challenge confronting the churches" as "the nation moves toward the elimination of segregation."

Detroit Public Library  
Book Receiving Dept.  
5201 Woodward Ave.  
Detroit 2, Mich.

27462 11-57

many serious and sincere brethren. It showed the weakness of us all. It destroyed many of our illusions. It forced us to begin writing a new chapter. It revealed the obstacles with which we must still more perseveringly struggle: prejudices, distrust, petrified anti-Communist opinions, and unwillingness to grapple with the complexities of the international situation, but also unfruitful abstract moralizing—and, added to all this, the extraordinary force of a restoration attitude.

The work before us is very difficult. At some moments it seems as if we had not made a single step in our ecumenical discussions. And still we must not succumb to bitterness and despair. The greatness of the Hungarian tragedy is for us a serious call for penitence and for prayers that we may all be given wisdom, patience and courage. I have intentionally not discussed the question centering around the Suez Canal, nor the figure of the Hungarian Cardinal who, in the beginning of November, became the symbol of European restoration. I directed my discussion solely on Hungary, because it is that country's grave political and moral crisis which shows us the depth of the crisis of the whole Christian community and the almost unbearable task which awaits us all in future days. But here again I repeat what we often recall. A time of God's judgment is also a time of great promise. In many places we see proofs of the fact that God's promises remain valid and that there are many who are guided by them in their faith, love and hope.

## CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion

537 WEST 121 ST. • NEW YORK 27 • N. Y.

### EDITORIAL BOARD

REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND JOHN C. BENNETT, *Chairmen*  
WAYNE H. COWAN, *Managing Editor*  
ARNOLD W. HEARN, *Assistant Editor*  
M. SEARLE BATES    WALDO BEACH    AMOS WILDER  
ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN    F. ERNEST JOHNSON  
JOSEPH SITTLER    HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

### CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

JAMES C. BAKER    FRANCIS P. MILLER    J. OSCAR LEE  
UMPHREY LEE    WILLIAM F. MAY    ROGER L. SHINN  
KENNETH W. THOMPSON    EDWARD L. PARSONS  
HENRY SMITH LEIPER    JOHN A. MACKAY  
LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

### CONTENTS

ON THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS

JOSEF L. HROMADKA

INDEX FOR VOLUME XVI



ae  
u-  
r.  
ll  
t,  
g-  
r-  
ct  
li.  
  
ae  
le  
ve  
ae  
i-  
y  
ve  
g  
n-  
n-  
I  
se  
is  
le  
le  
e  
of  
e.  
's  
o  
e.